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Abstract
We provide a North-South Schumpeterian growth model endogenously generating
demand-driven patterns of vertical intra-industrial trade. More precisely, we build a
model featuring non-homothetic preferences and income differences, and show that
such conditions guarantee the endogenous emergence of multi-location, multi-quality
firms. The existence of such firms and wealth heterogeneity among consumers both
across and within countries then generate and shape rich patterns of intra-industrial
vertical trade and FDI, with the extent of income disparities also conditioning the
incentives to invest in R&D of both incumbents and challengers, and by extension the
long-run growth rate. We then investigate the impact of within-region redistribution
and trade integration policies on the endogenous wage gap across regions, the length
of the quality-life cycle and long-run growth. We particularly find that a larger income
gap within regions contributes to lowering growth and increasing the inter-regional in-
equality level. We also find that trade integration boosts long run growth but increases
the North-South wage gap.
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1 Introduction
In 2004, the French car manufacturer Renault started to manufacture the “Logan” car
in its Romanian branch Dacia. The Logan was designed for the lower budget consumers
living in Eastern European countries, which were integrating the European Union in the
same year: it only offered basic technologies having already been used in some former
Renault models (Clio), and was sold at a much lower price than the other cars present on
the same market segment. However, even though this car was explicitly targeting Eastern
European demand and was produced in that market, it met a rapid and unexpected success
in Western Europe. By 2006, the car was exported back towards the French, Italian,
Spanish and German markets. This example illustrates: (i) how brand diversification can
give a second life to features having moved down the quality ladder, and how this extended
profitability might have an impact on the R&D investment of multi-quality, multinational
firms; (ii) the existing relationship between the local demand structure in growing and
non-growing economies and patterns of trade in quality.
Models of North-South trade studying the growth implications of innovation, imitation
and the resulting patterns of trade have already been provided (Grossman and Helpmann,
1991; Dinopoulos and Segerstrom, 2010).The main focus of this literature has been so
far to identify the impact of trade openness and intellectual property rights on North-
ern innovation and Southern imitation patterns, and on the resulting product life-cycle
and long-run growth. However, existing models usually focus on supply-driven determi-
nants of R&D investment and trade patterns, leaving out any impact of the aggregate
demand structure; also, they feature the traditional Schumpeterian creative destruction
effect (“Arrow effect”), with only the highest quality being consumed and traded in each
sector (inter-industrial trade patterns). Those two key features make the existing mod-
els unable to account for and investigate the growth and wealth distribution implications
of demand-driven, intra-industrial vertical trade patterns such as the Renault-Dacia one,
where income discrepancies across and within regions result in the existence of multi-quality
firms as well as in more than one quality of the same good being consumed and traded
at equilibrium. The present paper builds on these considerations, and aims at providing
a general equilibrium dynamic framework featuring the previously identified characteristics.
We develop a North-South Schumpeterian model of endogenous growth displaying non-
homothetic preferences as well as both within- and across- countries inequality. Firms
invest in R&D so as to invent higher qualities of existing products, and as in Latzer
(2013), the presence of unit consumption and inequality among consumers ensures both
the consumption of more than one quality at the equilibrium and innovation by incumbents,
allowing for the endogenous emergence of multi-quality firms. Indeed, differences in the
willingness to pay among heterogenous consumers make it profitable for firms to offer
several distinct price/quality bundles, so as to efficiently price-discriminate across different
income groups. The North is assumed to be the only region where innovation and the
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production of the highest available quality can take place; on the other hand, we identify
and focus on parametric conditions ensuring that the production of the second-best quality
locates itself in the South.
Under such conditions, we then demonstrate that the model features rich patterns of
intra-industrial vertical trade and FDI, with disparities in purchasing power within and
across regions ensuring the co-existence of mono-quality, mono-location firms and multi-
quality, multi-location firms. More precisely, we focus on the parametric cases for which
the new quality leader chooses to capture only the upper part of both the Northern and
Southern markets, abandoning the poor consumers to the former leader. In this case,
quality leaders having innovated only once produce their single quality in their Northern
home region and export part of their production towards the Southern foreign market
(mono-product local firms), while former leaders having been leapfrogged and now selling
the second-best quality engage in FDI to serve locally the Southern host market and export
back part of their production to their Northern home region (mono-product delocated
firms). On the other hand, successful incumbents having at their disposal two successive
qualities then locate the production of the highest quality in the North, and optimally
choose to locate the production of their lowest quality in the South, where demand for
this quality is relatively high and where labor costs are lower (multi-quality, multi-location
firms). Beyond those vertical trade patterns, the extent of income inequality also influences
the incentives to invest in R&D of both incumbents and challengers, and hence conditions
the long-run growth rate and inequality level across regions.
We then investigate the impact of trade integration as well as intra-regional redistri-
bution policies on the endogenous wage gap (inter-regional inequality level) and on the
innovation rate per type of firms (i.e. challengers or incumbents). In the absence of closed-
from analytical solutions, we proceed to simulations so as to determine the comparative
statics following a shock on the transport costs τ , the wealth gap d or the degree of wealth
concentration β. We find in particular that long-run growth unambiguously decreases fol-
lowing an increase in the intra-country wealth gap: such a result is at odds with what
had been exemplified so far in closed-country growth frameworks (Foellmi and Zweimuller,
2006; Latzer, 2013), and points to the necessity of taking into account trade patterns when
analyzing the impact of redistribution policies. Another salient result pertains to the long-
run growth impact of trade liberalization, which is found to be positive in our model: such
an impact had not been exemplified so far by existing North-South Schumpeterian models
(Borota, 2012).
Our main contribution to the literature consists in providing a Schumpeterian growth
model where demand-based determinants both generate and shape patterns of intra-industrial
vertical trade, hence being able to account for so far overlooked inequality-driven trade pat-
terns such as the Renault-Dacia one. We are then also able to emphasize so far overlooked
impacts of within-country redistribution and trade liberalization policies.
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Relation to literature.
Our work is related to several strands of literature. Recent contributions in the interna-
tional trade literature have investigated the specific role and importance of multi-product
firms (Bernard et al., 2010), especially considering the influence of trade patterns on their
portfolio composition and resulting R&D investments (Eckel and Neary, 2010; Dhingra,
2013). However, our model is the first one to investigate this question in a vertical differ-
entiation quality-ladder framework, where the impact of the aggregate demand structure
on a firm’s portfolio does not operate through cannibalization effects but rather through
price discrimination opportunities (Mussa and Rosen, 1978). Another recent strand of lit-
erature has been exemplifying the existence and importance of demand-driven patterns of
vertical intra-industrial trade and FDI (Fajgelbaum et al., 2011; Grossman et al., 2012).
However, the models provided so far have been developed in a static framework, leaving the
modeling of the R&D investment and the subsequent impact of demand structure on the
design of new qualities out of the model’s reach: our model on the other hand explicitly ac-
counts for innovation dynamics. Finally, dynamic North-South Schumpeterian models have
been investigating the long-run growth impact of vertical trade (Grossman and Helpmann,
1991; Segerstrom and Dinopoulos, 2006; Dinopoulos and Segerstrom, 2010); however, as
already mentioned above, those models have so far only taken into account inter-industry
trade (product life cycle). Indeed, the Arrow effect traditionally present in quality-ladder
models leaves room for the consumption of only the highest quality within each sector,
whose production either in the North or the South generates supply-based inter-industrial
patterns of trade. Our model, on the other hand, provides demand-driven, vertical intra-
industrial trade patterns (quality life cycle). Finally, while Borota (2012) offered in a recent
contribution a dynamic North-South model accounting for empirically identified patterns
of intra-industrial trade, the determinants of regional quality specialization as well as the
resulting growth and trade patterns are solely driven by supply characteristics in her model.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model, while
Section 3 derives equilibrium conditions and characteristics. Section 4 then investigates
the impact of a redistribution shock on relative wages, long-run growth and welfare, while
Section 5 sheds light on the distribution distortions arising from trade openness.
2 The model
The model uses the framework developed by Latzer (2013), but assumes the existence




2.1.1 Wealth distribution across the world
Across the globe, we model a fixed number L of consumers that live infinitely and
inelastically supply one unit of labor each period. There are two regions, respectively
denoted as North and South (r = N,S), with labor being immobile across regions. All
consumers have the same preferences, but are assumed to differ in terms of income. More
precisely, the world population is heterogenous in terms of (1) asset ownership and (2)
labor income.
(1) Regarding asset ownership, the world population is split into two groups: the poor
(P) and the rich (R). The share of “poor” consumers within the world population is
denoted by β. The ratio of asset endowments ωP (t) of a poor consumer relative to the
average per-capita amount of assets is denoted by d: we have d = ωP (t)Ω(t)/L , with Ω(t)
being the aggregate amount of assets. Given d, the assets owned by a rich consumer
can be computed as ωR(t) = 1−βd1−β
Ω(t)
L . Hence, the extent of inequality in terms of
asset ownership is fully described by the two parameters β and d. Finally, we assume
that a fraction ξ of the poor population and a fraction σ of the rich population live
in the North.
(2) Regarding labor income, we restrict ourselves to parametric cases where wages
in the South wS(t) are endogenously lower than wages in the North, which are equal
to the numeraire (see infra wN = 1). That is wS(t) < wN (t) = 1. From then on, we
will hence consider the Southern wage as the relative wage between the two regions,
and simply label it w(t). Note that this relative wage can also serve as a measure of
the wage gap between the two regions (the lower w(t), the wider the gap).
Heterogeneity in wages entails income inequality across regions, while the heterogeneity
in asset endowments induces income inequality within regions. We can hence distinguish
four groups of consumers in the world: the rich living in the North (NR), the rich living
in the South (SR), the poor living in the North (NP), and finally the poor living in the
South (SP). The respective size of those different groups can be inferred from the previously
introduced parameters describing income distribution across the world:
LNR = σ(1− β)L, LNP = ξβL, LSR = (1− σ)(1− β)L, LSP = (1− ξ)βL
We have the following expressions for the four possible levels of income:
yNR(t) = 1 + r(t)ωR(t) (1)
yNP (t) = 1 + r(t)ωP (t) (2)
ySR(t) = w(t) + r(t)ωR(t) (3)
ySP (t) = w(t) + r(t)ωP (t) (4)
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with r(t) being the interest rate.
2.1.2 Preferences
Current income is spent for the consumption of two types of final goods: a homogenous
commodity and a continuum of differentiated goods.
The homogenous good is produced under perfect competition with labor alone, requires
a unit labor input and is nontradable across regions. We choose the Northern standardized
good as the numeraire, and hence have as stated above wN (t) = 1.
The other group of products, indexed by s ∈ [0, 1], is subject to quality innovation over
time. At any date t, we assume that a sequence of qualities qj(s, t), j = 0,−1,−2, ... exist
and can be produced within each industry s, with q0(s, t) being the best quality, q−1(s, t)
the second-best, etc. Two successive qualities differ by a fixed factor k > 1: qj(s, t) =
kqj−1(s, t). By assumption, consumers value only one unit of each differentiated
good. As in Zweimuller and Brunner (2005), this unit consumption feature is the key
assumption guaranteeing the non-homotheticity of the preference structure in this model.
Indeed, for each industry s at each period t, an individual belonging to group i living
in region r then chooses to consume the quality level qj(s, t) that offers him the highest
utility, considering its price pr(s, t, qj(s, t)). We denote this quality qrij(s, t), and the index
of consumed qualities over industries Qri(t) =
∫ 1
0 qrij(s, t)ds. He then spends the rest of
his income over the consumption of cri(t) units of the locally produced homogenous good.
Using the unit consumption property, the log-linear instantaneous utility uri(t) of a
type i consumer living in region r can hence be expressed the following way:
uri(t) = ln cri(t) + lnQri(t) = ln (yri(t)− Pri(t, Qri(t))) + lnQri(t) (5)
with Pri(t, Qri(t)) =
∫ 1
0 p(s, t, qrij(s, t))ds being the price index associated to the quality
good consumption index Qri(t). Please note that for the sake of notation simplicity, we
will from now on refer to this price index as Pri(t), and to the price being charged for
quality j in sector s in country r as pj(r, s, t).
At time τ , the intertemporal decision problem of a type i consumer living in region r
is to maximize:Z ∞
τ















with ρ being the rate of time preference. Given an expected time path for both the
interest rate r(t) and the relationship between quality and price indices, it is then possible to
determine the optimal time path of cri(t) (i.e. the consumption devoted to the standardized
commodity) and of Qri(t) (i.e. the chosen quality for each quality-differentiated good) for
a consumer of type i living in region r.
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Separability of utility (both over time and across goods) guarantees that for any given
foreseen time path Pri(t) of expenditures devoted to the continuum of quality goods that
does not exhaust life-time resources, the optimal path of consumption expenditures on the




= r(t)− ρ (6)
The optimal time path of Qri(t), on the other hand, cannot be characterized by a dif-
ferential equation, since the quality choices are discrete. It is possible to notice however
that within each industry s, the choice of the quality qrij(s, t) being consumed by a type
i individual living in region r depends on the pricing decisions p(s, t, qrij(s, t)) made by
profit-maximizing firms. We hence set aside the discrete quality choices on the part of con-
sumers until having defined the market and price structure for each of the quality sectors.
The focus of this article is on the balanced growth path (BGP) properties of such a
model, along which all variables remain constant or grow at a constant rate. Even though
the equilibrium as well as the BGP will only be formally defined in section 3, from now
on we will omit the functional dependance of the different variables on time, so as to
simplify notations. Also, we will immediately focus on “multi-quality, multi-location firms”
equilibria, i.e. balanced growth paths in which (i) incumbents invest a positive amount in
R&D, and (ii) former producers survive in the case the new leader detains only monopoly
rights on the highest quality. We take the existence of such equilibria for granted in the
rest of this section, but will clearly discuss the parameter conditions guaranteeing their
existence and uniqueness in section 3.
2.2 Producers
The market for quality goods is non-competitive. Labor is the only input, with constant
unit labor requirement a < 1.1 We assume that firms who own the blueprint for a given
quality in a given sector also have the capacity to costlessly adapt the design of the product
to each of the market they intend serving, so as to make it impossible for a third party
to resell it on another market; in other words, we preclude the possibility of international
arbitrage.2 The quality goods being characterized by unit consumption and fixed quality
increments, firms use prices as strategic variables. Firms know the shares of groups P and
R in the world population, the respective incomes yrR and yrP as well as the preferences of
1Given the model assumes unit consumption of the quality goods, a necessarily has to be inferior to 1.
2International arbitrage (or carry-along trade) designates the practice of exploiting differences in the
pricing of the same good on different markets. An arbitrageur can then purchase the good cheaply on the
market where the price is the lowest, ship it to the high-price market, and re-sell it with profits. As Follmi
et al. (2011) demonstrate, such arbitrage opportunities significantly impact patterns of trade, and more
precisely account for “export zeros” between rich and poor countries; however, for the sake of simplicity we
abstract from such considerations in our benchmark model.
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the consumers within each region r, but cannot distinguish individuals by income. Also, as
it will be further commented below, firms within each sector only consider their strategic
interactions with other firms of the same sector, and do not internalize the impact of their
pricing decisions on consumption allocation across sectors, aggregate wealth Ω, relative
wages w and aggregate R&D efforts.
2.2.1 Market structure and sector-specific pricing strategies
The detailed demonstrations regarding the market structure and pricing can be found in
Latzer (2013). We will here only reproduce the main propositions and intuitions, adapting
them to an open economy framework.
First, in order to comment the strategic decisions operated by firms within a given
industry, it is necessary to define the “threshold” price pT{j−m,j}(i, r, s) for which a consumer
belonging to group i living in region r is indifferent between quality j and quality j−m in
industry s, given the price pj−m(r, s) charged for quality j −m in country r. Determining
such a threshold price amounts to solving the following equality:
ln(qj(s))− ln(qj−m(s)) = λri[pT{j−m,j}(i, r, s)− pj−m(r, s)] (7)
The left-hand side of equality (7) is the utility gain when consuming quality qj(s) rather
than quality qj−m(s); the right-hand side on the other hand captures the costs associated
to choosing qj(s) over qj−m(s), expressed as the price difference pT{j−m,j}(i, r, s)−pj−m(r, s)
times the marginal utility of income λri of a consumer belonging to group i living in country
r. It is important to notice that while λri depends on the overall price index Pri, firms
within a particular sector take it as given in their decision-making. Indeed, because of
the existence of a continuum of quality good industries, firms within a given sector are
“small in the big, but big in the small” (Neary, 2009): even though they resort to strategic
pricing within their own industry, they do not take into account the impact of their pricing
decisions on economy-wide variables.3 Considering the fact that qj(s) = kmqj−m(s) and
defining µri = 1λri as the willingness to pay of a consumer belonging to group i living in
country r, solving for pT{j−m,j}(i, r, s) in the above equality yields:
pT{j−m,j}(i, r, s) = µri ln k
m + pj−m(r, s) (8)
The price pT{j−m,j}(i, r, s) is the maximum price that the firm selling the quality j in industry
s can charge to a type i consumer living in country r in order to have a positive market
share, when competing against the firm selling the quality j − m. As one can see, this
threshold price positively depends on the willingness to pay of type i consumers µri = 1λi
(with µR > µP ), as well as on the price charged by the competitor pj−m(r, s).
For a world economy characterized by two distinct groups of consumers (R and P) living
in two distinct regions/markets (N and S) in which the possibility of international
3For a similar pricing decision problem in the case of successful innovators in a R&D-driven growth
model, see Foellmi et al. (2009).
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Figure 1: Two possible states
arbitrage is excluded, it is then possible to establish:
Lemma 1 Within each sector s ∈ [0, 1], we have that at equilibrium,
(1) The highest quality is produced,
(2) At most the two highest qualities q0 and q−1 are actually produced.
Proof: The detailed proof can be found in Zweimuller and Brunner (2005) for a closed
economy composed of two consumer groups. It can immediately be applied to our frame-
work with 4 groups of consumers spread in two different regions because of our exclusion of
the possibility of carry-along trade. Indeed, precluding international arbitrage guarantees
that the producer of a given quality (whether it is the highest or the second-best) can treat
the North and the South as two hermetic markets, in which they can carry out two pricing
strategies totally independent from each other. 
In our model, the incumbent is investing in R&D, and can hence innovate twice in
a row. Each industry s then fluctuates between two states over time, depending on the
winner of the last innovation race (see Figure 1 for an illustration). In our two-country
set-up, the two possible states (SC) and (SI) can be characterized in the following way:
• “Successful Challenger” (SC) state: a challenger is the winner of the last R&D
race, i.e. the new quality leader is different from the former quality leader. The new
quality leader then only retains exclusive monopoly rights for the highest quality q0,
and depending on its pricing strategy, the producer of the quality q−1 might remain
active (duopoly market structure) or be driven out of the market (monopoly market
structure).
• “Successful Incumbent” (SI) state: the current quality leader, still carrying out
R&D, is the winner of the next R&D race, and hence retains exclusive monopoly
rights for both the highest quality q0(s) and the second-best quality q−1(s). According
to lemma 1, the market structure is then a monopoly, with the quality leader offering
two different price/quality bundles in order to discriminate between the groups P
and R in each market.
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In the following analysis, we will focus on discussing at length the resolution of the
case where the market structure is a duopoly in the (SC) state, i.e. the case where the
income distribution makes it optimal for the new quality leader to sell the highest quality
q0 to the rich consumers only, abandoning the poor consumers to the producer of quality
q−1. Two reasons justify this exposition choice. First, since the objective of this paper
is to reproduce and analyze the implications of “quality-life cycle” trade patterns such as
the “Renault-Dacia” one, the case where two distinct qualities are sold and traded in every
industry (and not only in (SI)-state industries) is the most relevant one. Second, as it
will become clear in the following sections, the duopoly case is (perhaps unexpectedly) the
one guaranteeing the simplest expressions for the main endogenous variables, enabling us
to analytically guarantee its existence and robustness under clearly identified parametric
conditions.4
2.2.2 Equilibrium prices and profits
In the duopoly case, the prices being charged to each consumer type ri are similar across
industries: only the identity of the firm producing quality q−1 differs. Indeed, quality q0
is systematically sold by the winner of the latest innovation race at the threshold price
pT{−1,0}(R, r, s), given the price p−1(r, s) being charged for quality q−1 in the region r.
In industries being in the (SC) state, the former quality leader then remains active, and
charges the highest possible price enabling him to capture the poor group of consumers
pT{−2,−1}(P, r, s), given that the producer of quality q−2 engages in marginal cost pricing
(p−2(r, s) = cr with cr being the unit production cost of q−2 for the region r). In industries
being in the (SI) state on the other hand, the new quality leader also chooses to sell the
second-best quality (over which it retains exclusive monopoly rights, since it has innovated
twice in a row) at the price pT{−2,−1}(P, r, s). Defining κ = ln k and dropping the industry
indices from then on, the prices paid by the four groups of consumers in every in industry
s are then of the form:
pNP = κµNP + cN , pNR = κµNR + pNP (9)
pSP = κµSP + cS , pSR = κµSR + pSP (10)
Finally, the first-order condition governing the amount of divisible homogenous good cri
being consumed by a type ri consumer yields the following expression for the marginal





yri − Pri = λri (11)
The computation of the willingness to pay µri = 1λri hence depends on the price index for
the quality goods Pri each type of consumer is facing. Since we just established that in
the duopoly case, every industry enters symmetrically in the price index, we simply have
4Indeed, in the monopoly case, the quality-good price index PrR paid by the rich consumers in each
country depends on the share of industries being in the (SC) state (Latzer, 2013), which makes the com-
putations far more complex.
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µri = yri − pri. Plugging this expression back in (9)− (10), we finally obtain the following























Let piL be the profits associated to selling the highest quality available, and piF the profits
reaped from selling the second-best quality. We assume the existence of “iceberg” trade
costs: in order to export to country r (r ∈ {N,S}) one unit of quality good manufactured
in country v (v ∈ {N,S}, v 6= r), a firm must ship τ ≥ 1 units. We then have:
piL = LNR(pNR − a) + LSR(pSR − τa), piF = LNP (pNP − cN ) + LSP (pSP − cS) (16)
In industries being in the (SC) state, those two profits are reaped by two distinct firms: piL
accrues to the winner of the latest innovation race, while piF is won by the former quality
leader (now producer of the second-best quality). In industries being in the (SI) state, the
successful incumbent sells the two available qualities, and earns profits piSI = piL + piF .
2.2.3 Location choice for the producer of the second-best quality
While we assume that the highest technology can be used by the North only, we have
so far left the location of the second-best producer uncharacterized. In each state, we let
the producer of the second-best quality choose bewteen continuing production in the North
or costlessly moving it to the South.5 Let pirF be the instantaneous profits associated to
the production of the second best quality when locating in region r. Considering that a
single firm does not internalize the effects of its location choice on aggregate variables, we
can establish that:




F , guaranteeing that the production
of the second-best quality is located in the South for every sector s.
Proof: In the case the producer of the second-best quality is located in the South, we have
cS = wa and cN = τaw; in the case the producer of the second-best quality is located in
the North, we have cS = τa and cN = a. Plugging those values into pNP and pSP , we have
piSN − piNF = βaL κκ+1(ξ(1− τw) + (1− ξ)(τ −w)). Firms consider the sign of this difference
when choosing where to locate. Since we restrict ourselves to parametric cases where w < 1
5Introducing relocation costs would lower the incentives to move to the South, creating an arbitrage
between lower marginal costs and the existence of fixed costs in the case of FDI; however, it wouldn’t
change the main intuition, which is that a given firm will locate itself so as to locally serve the biggest
market.
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and we have τ > 1, for values of w such that τw < 1 we necessarily have piSF −piNF > 0. For
values of w such that τw > 1, we need to have 1−ξξ (τ−w) > τw−1 to ensure that producers
of q−1 locate in the South. If ξ < 1/2, we have 1−ξξ (τ − w) > τ − w > τw − 1 (the second
part of the expression is systematically true since τ −w− (τw−1) = τ +1−w(τ +1) > 0).
Hence, for values of ξ < 1/2, we have piSF −piNF > 0 for any value of the endogenous relative
wage w < 1. This ends the proof. 
Profits of firms diminish along both transport and wage costs, while unit consumption
ensures that the size of demand in a given region is uniquely pinned down by the size of its
population Lr. Hence, provided ξ < 1/2, there necessarily is a larger demand in the South
for the second-best quality, and firms will choose to locate so as to serve this demand
locally while avoiding transport costs and benefitting from lower wages. This choice is
independant of the state each industry finds itself in, since the profits generated by selling
the second-best quality are the same, whether it is produced by the follower (SC state) or
by the differentiated monopolist (SI state).
From then on, since we want to be able to investigate the growth implications of vertical
patterns of trade such as the “Renault-Dacia” one (i.e. including positive export flows from
the South to the North for the lowest qualities), we focus on such parametric cases, and
impose ξ < 1/2. That is, there are more poors in the South than in the North.
2.3 R&D sector
Firms engage in R&D to discover the next quality level, with R&D activities being
located in the North only. We assume free entry, with every firm having access to the same
R&D technology. Innovations occur for a given firm i according to a Poisson process of
hazard rate φi. Labor is the only input, and we assume constant returns to R&D at the
firm level. To have an immediate probability of innovating of φf , a firm f needs to hire
Fφf Northern labor units, F being a positive constant inversely related to the efficiency
of the R&D technology. We define the following expected present values: vC for the value
of a challenger firm, vSC and vSI for the values of a quality leader having respectively
innovated once and twice, and vF as the value of a leapfrogged leader (follower). Free entry
and constant returns to scale imply that R&D challengers have no market value, whatever
state the economy finds itself in: vC = 0. Free entry of challengers in the successive R&D
races also yields the traditional equality constraint between expected profits of innovating
for the first time φCvSC and engaged costs φCF :
vSC = F (17)
The incumbent participates to the race while having already innovated at least once, and
hence being the current producer of the leading quality in case (SC)/of the two highest
qualities in case (SI). In industries being currently in the (SC) state, the incumbent faces
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the following Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation:
rvSC = max
φI,SC≥0
{piL − FφI,SC + φI,SC(vSI − vSC) + φC(vF − vSC)} (18)
The incumbent in the (SC) state earns the profits piL , and incurs the R&D costs FφI,SC .
With instantaneous probability φI,SC , the leader innovates once more, the industry jumps
to the state (SI), and the value of the leader (now producing and selling two distinct
qualities) climbs to vSI . However, with overall instantaneous probability φC , some R&D
challenger innovates, and the quality leader then becomes a follower: its value drops to vF .
The industry then remains in the state (SC).
In the (SI) state on the other hand, the incumbent faces the following HJB equation:
rvSI = max
φI,SI≥0
{piSI − FφI,SI + φI,SI(vSI − vSI) + φC(vF − vSI)} (19)
The incumbent in the (SI) state earns the profits piSI = piL+piF of a monopolist being able
to discriminate between rich and poor consumers by offering two distinct price/quantity
bundles. He incurs the R&D costs FφI,SI . With instantaneous probability φI,SI , the
incumbent innovates once more, in which case its value remains vSI (cf lemma 1): the
incumbent is then still the producer of the two qualities being sold, but he has driven
himself out of the market for the former quality q−1, that has become quality q−2 with the
latest quality jump. With instantaneous probability φC ,6 some R&D follower innovates,
and the quality leader then becomes a follower: its value falls to vF .
Finally, we have a last actor with non-null profits, i.e. the producer of the quality q−1




{piF − wFφF + φF (vSC − vF ) + (φC + φI)(vC − vF )} (20)
The follower in the (SC) state earns the profits piF , and incurs the R&D costs FφF . With
instantaneous probability φF , the follower innovates, in which case its value becomes vSC .
With instantaneous probability φC on the other hand, some R&D challenger innovates,
and the follower’s value falls back to vC = 0.
The three corresponding first-order conditions are of the following form:
(−F + vSI − vSC)φI,SC = 0, φI,SC ≥ 0 (21)
(−F + vSC − vF )φF = 0, φF ≥ 0 (22)
−FφI,SI = 0, φI,SI ≥ 0 (23)
(23) immediately implies φI,SI = 0. From then on, we hence refer to the investment in
6The challengers invest the same amount in the R&D sector φC in both states (SC) and (SI), since
they face the same expected reward vSC in both cases: a successful innovation by a challenger indeed
always brings the industry back to state (SC).
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R&D of the incumbent firm in the (SC) state as simply φI . Combined with (17), (22)
entails either φF = 0 or vF = 0. The second possibility cannot be true, since the follower’s
profits piF are strictly positive: we hence necessarily have that φF = 0. Plugging this value
back into (20), we obtain that vF = piFr+φC+φI . Finally, plugging the free-entry condition
(17) and the first-order condition (22) in the HJB equations (18) and (19), it is possible
to obtain the 2 following expressions, equating incurred R&D costs and expected profits

















3 Balanced growth path analysis
3.1 Labor market equilibrium
We denote by θSC the fraction of all industries for which the latest innovator is a
challenger (i.e. being in the (SC) state), and θSI the fraction of all industries for which the
last innovation race has been won by an incumbent (i.e. being in the (SI) state). While
challengers invest an equal amount in R&D in every industry, incumbents only invest in
R&D in industries being in the (SC) state; the total Northern labor demand in the R&D
sector is hence equal to F (φC +
∫
θSC
φI(s)ds). Since we imposed unit consumption of the
quality good, a(LNR + τLSR) units of Northern labor are devoted to the production of the
highest quality good.7 Similarly, since the second-best quality is sold to poor consumers in
both regions and produced in the South, we have a(τLNP +LSP ) units of labor devoted to
the production of the quality q−1 in the South. Finally, LNR(yNR−pNR)+LNP (yNP−pNP )
units of labor are devoted to the production of the standardized good in the North, and
LSR(1/w)(ySR−pSR)+LSP (1/w)(ySP −pSP ) units of labor are devoted to the production
of the standardized good in the South.
We hence have the following equation characterizing the equilibrium on the labor mar-
ket in each region:
LN = FφC + θSCFφI + a(LNR + τLSR) + LNR(yNR − pNR) + LNP (yNP − pNP ) (26)
LS = a(τLNP + LSP ) + LSR(1/w)(ySR − pSR) + LSP (1/w)(ySP − pSP ) (27)
It is then possible to transform those two labor equilibrium conditions so as to obtain a
relationship between profit flows and the overall wealth within the economy Ω. Summing
up (26) and (27), replacing yP and yR by their respective values, keeping in mind that
7Indeed, as previously mentioned, the highest quality is sold to rich in both regions, and we impose for
its production to take place in the North.
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piL + piF = piSI and rearranging terms, we get:
F (φC + θSCφI)− piSI + rΩ = 0 (28)
Using (24) so as to substitute for F , we finally obtain the expected identity between overall
wealth of the consumers Ω and the present discounted value of firms’ profits within the








3.2 Balanced growth path analysis
Definition 1 In the case we have a duopoly market structure in the (SC) state, an
equilibrium is defined by a time path for consumption of the homogenous good for the
four consumer types {cri(t)}∞t=0 that satisfies (11), time paths for R&D expenditures by
incumbents and challengers {φC(s, t), φI(s, t)}∞s∈(0,1),t=0 that satisfy (17), (18) and (19),
time paths of prices and present discounted value of firms’ profits {pri,Ω(t)}∞t=0 given by
(12), (13), (14), (15), (16), and (29), a time path for Southern wages {w(t)}∞t=0 given by
(27), and a time path of the interest rate {r(t)}∞t=0 which satisfies (6).
In addition, we define a balanced growth path (BGP) as an equilibrium path along
which every variable grows at a constant rate, either null or positive. In such a product-
innovation model (i.e. precluding any productivity improvement) with a fixed population
level L, the BGP is characterized by constant levels of innovation φC and φI , overall wealth
Ω and consumption cri (i = R,P ; r = N,S).8 Consumers however still become better-off
over time due to the quality improvements of the differentiated goods and the resulting
growth of individual utility. As already stated in the previous section, we focus in this
paper on such a BGP, and we now proceed to describing its properties.
Along such a BGP, it is possible to express θSC and θSI as functions of the innovation
rates φC and φI . Indeed, along the BGP we have that the flows in must equal the flows
out of each state: we then have the condition φCθSI = φIθSC that has to be respected.9








Proposition 2 (Existence and uniqueness of the BGP equilibrium) For τ, a, d suf-
ficiently low and β, L sufficiently high, there exists a unique BGP along which (i) we have
a duopoly in the (SC) state, (ii) both incumbents and challengers invest strictly positive
amounts in R&D φI and φC , and (iii) the consumers’ utility grows at the constant rate
γ = κφC(1 + φIφI+φC ).
8The consumption of the continuum of quality-differentiated goods is anyway always constant, since we
impose unit consumption in this model.
9Indeed, for each industry being in the (SC) state, the probability to exit this state is equal to the
probability φI(s) of an incumbent innovating; for each industry being in the (SI) state, the probability to
enter the (SC) state corresponds to the probability φC(s) of a challenger innovating.
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Proof: cf Appendix A.
Existence and uniqueness of the BGP hence occurs under the following parameter con-
ditions:10 (i) τ and a sufficiently low and L sufficiently high, i.e. sufficiently low marginal
production costs and a sufficiently large overall market size so as to ensure positive profits
in every market segment; (ii) d sufficiently low, i.e the wealthy groups in both the North
and the South are rich enough to entice the successful challenger to choose the “duopoly”
pricing strategy enabling him to fully exploit their higher willingness to pay; β sufficiently
high, i.e. the size of the poor consumers groups is big enough to ensure that the follower’s
profits are positive, despite the rather large size of the within-country wealth gap. These
conditions hence yield the coexistence of positive R&D investments by firms willing to
become a successful challenger (φC) or a successful incumbent (φI).
We have hence designed a North-South model where disparities in purchasing power
within and across regions ensure the co-existence of 2 types of firms:
• Mono-product, mono-location firms.
Within this type, we distinguish two cases: (i) firms producing in their home region
and exporting part of their production towards the foreign market (mono-product
local firms), and (ii) firms engaging in FDI to serve the host market while exporting
back part of their production to serve their home region (mono-product delocated
firms).
(i) The mono-product local firms are successful challengers who only have at their
disposal the highest available quality, which cannot be produced in the South. They
hence locate their production in the North, and serve the upper part of the Southern
market through exports.
(ii) The mono-product delocated firms, on the other hand, are former leaders who
have been leapfrogged, and whose quality has become second-best. Those firms
choose to locate in the South, where the relative demand for the second-best quality
is higher and where the production costs are lower. Hence, while they avoid transport
costs for the main share of their sales, they serve consumers in their country of origin
through exports.
• Multi-quality, multi-location firms.
These firms are the successful incumbents, who have at their disposal two successive
qualities and can then efficiently discriminate between consumers by offering various
price/quality bundles, reaping maximum surplus from all the consumer segments
across the globe. They locate the production of the highest quality in the North, and
optimally choose to locate the production of their lowest quality in the South, where
demand for this quality is relatively high and where labor costs are lower. Because
10For a full exposition and discussion of the parameter conditions, see App A.2
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the two qualities are consumed in the two regions, those firms simultaneously resort
to both FDI and exports, serving the upper part of the Southern market and the
lower part of the Northern market through exports.
Beyond the existence of multi-quality firms already identified in Latzer (2013), we have
hence demonstrated that under non-homotheticity of preferences, income disparities also
generate rich inequality-driven intra-industrial trade patterns. A full investigation of the
impact of income distribution (and hence of redistribution policies) on long-run growth and
other macroeconomic outcomes hence benefits from being carried out in an international
trade framework. Similarly, predictions regarding the long-run macroeconomic impact of
trade openness shocks might be influenced by the existing interactions existing between
income inequality (across- and within regions), R&D investment and trade patterns. We
now move to investigating those questions in the next section.
4 Income distribution, trade integration and innovation
In this section, we study the implications of such a model of intra-industrial trade re-
garding the existing interactions between (i) income distribution and innovation of multi-
quality, multinational firms; (ii) within- and across country inequality levels; (iii) trade
integration, the long-run growth rate and the inter-regional wage gap. In the following
analysis, we consider two types of variations in the extent of wealth disparities: (a) a
greater wealth concentration (i.e. an increase in β for a given d) and (b) a larger income
gap (i.e. a decrease in d for a fixed level of β). We also analyze the effect of trade inte-
gration (i.e. a decrease in τ). The results can be summarized in the following numerical
findings:
Numerical finding 1: effects of a greater wealth concentration.
Under the parametric conditions identified in Proposition 1, a greater wealth concentration
(corresponding to an increase in β) leads to: an unambiguous increase in the challengers’
innovation rate φC and decrease in the incumbent’s innovation rate φI ; an increase of the
Southern wage rate w in most parametric cases; an ambiguous effect on the overall growth
rate γ.
It should first be signaled that a rise in the share of the population being poor β while
keeping d constant corresponds to a higher concentration of wealth among a smaller group
of rich people. Indeed, it implies an increase in the relative wealth of rich consumers
(∂dR∂β =
1−d
(1−β)2 > 0): there are more poor (both in the North and the South) with the same
income, and fewer rich with more income.
We first comment on the variation of the Southern wage rate w, which can be inter-
preted as a reverse measure of the interregional wage gap: the lower w, the higher the
Northern relative wage 1w , and the wider the inequality level across regions. As one can
see considering (27), the value of w is pinned down by the equilibrium condition on the
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Southern labor market. In the case of a positive shock on β, the size of the poor population
in the world βL has increased: because of our unit consumption requirement of the quality
good and considering the fact that the second-best quality sold to the poor is produced in
the South, labor demand for the production of the quality good a(τLNP +LSP ) increases
following a positive shock on β.11 A greater wealth concentration on the other hand nega-
tively impacts the labor demand for the production of the homogenous good. Indeed, the
rich become wealthier but are also charged a higher price for the quality good, while the
poor become more numerous and are still charged the same price than before: in total, the
amount of standardized good being consumed (and hence produced) ends up diminishing.
In most parametric cases, the positive effect of a higher labor demand for the quality good
seems however to dominate, and w increases.
So as to rationalize the variations of the incumbents’ and challengers’ innovation rates
φI and φC , we consider the impact of a wealth concentration shock on the expected profits
following a successful innovation. It should first be noted that such a shock generates
variations in the expected profits through market-size, price and marginal costs (through
the resulting variation in w) effects. We then consider the expected profits of a successful
challenger, i.e. piL + φC piFφC+φI+ρ . Those profits are composed of two distinct parts: (i)
the “first-round”, immediate profits piL stemming from having successfully innovated, and
(ii) the actualized, “second-round” profits φC piFφC+φI+ρ accruing from becoming a follower
in the case leapfrogging occurs. The first-round profits piL are impacted by a negative
market-size effect and a positive price effect: monopolists in the (SC) state indeed sell
their new leading quality to a smaller group of consumers, but at a higher price. On the
other hand, the second-round profits piF benefit from a positive market-size effect (the size
of the poor consumers group has increased), but are negatively impacted by the increase
in the Southern unit production costs resulting from a higher w. The conjugated positive
first-round price and second-round market-size effects finally seem to dominate, since φC
increases in every considered parametric case. On the other hand, the decrease in the
incumbent’s innovation rate φI stems from the decrease in the incremental profits piF of
a firm successfully innovating for the second time following the increase in its production
costs w (the second-best quality being systematically produced in the South under the
parametric condition ξ < 12).
Finally, the opposite directions of the variations of φC and φI leave the impact on




undetermined: the effect of a greater wealth
concentration on the long-run growth rate is ambiguous.
Numerical findings 2: effects of a larger income gap.
Under the parametric conditions identified in Proposition 1, a larger income gap (corre-
sponding to a decrease in d) leads to: an unambiguous decrease in the challengers’ inno-
11Because of our assumption that ξ < 1/2, we also have that the labor supply LS has augmented;
however, the increase in the labor demand for the quality good is stronger, since part of the production is
also exported back to the Northern poor, whose number increased as well following a positive shock on β.
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vation rate φC , the Southern wage rate w and the overall growth rate γ; an unambiguous
increase in the incumbent’s innovation rate φI .
We first consider the impact of a larger income gap on relative wages. Following a
negative shock on d, the quantity of labor hired in the quality good production sector is
left unchanged under our unit consumption assumption: indeed, variations in d leave the
size of the poor and rich groups unchanged. On the other hand, a larger wealth gap and
the resulting more unequal income distribution diminishes the overall expenses devoted to
the homogenous good: indeed, price discrimination is more effective in the case of the rich
group, and their residual expenses devoted to the consumption of the standardized good
decrease; this negative variation ends up dominating the increase in the homogenous good
consumption of the poor group. Labor demand for the production of the homogenous good
in the South hence decreases; as a consequence, w moves downwards following a decrease
in d. We hence have that a greater within-country inequality level also contributes to a
greater North-South wage gap.
So as to understand the variations of φI and φC , we again consider the impact of a
decrease in d on the expected profits of both types of firms operating in the R&D sector.
The first-round profits piL are impacted by a positive price effect (the rich have become
wealthier, and their willingness to pay for quality has hence increased), but suffer from an
increase in the production costs: indeed, the Southern wage has diminished, which hints
at an increase of the relative Northern wage 1w . On the other hand, the second-round
profits piF are impacted by a negative price effect (the poor have become poorer), but
are boosted by a decrease in the unit production costs of the second-best quality. The
fact that φC unambiguously decreases hints at the fact that the combined impact of the
two negative effects (first-round increase in the production costs and second-round price
effect) dominates. On the other hand, the variation of φI following such a redistribution
shock is ambiguous. Finally, we find that in every carried out simulation, the growth rate
γ diminishes following an increase in the within country wealth gap: a greater inequality
level is hence detrimental for long-run growth.
Numerical findings 3: effects of trade integration.
Under the parametric conditions identified in Proposition 1, trade integration (correspond-
ing to a decrease in the iceberg transport costs τ) leads to: an unambiguous increase in
the incumbent’s innovation rate φI and the overall growth rate γ, and a decrease in the
Southern wage rate w.
A decrease in the iceberg transportation costs τ leads to a lower labor demand for the
production of the quality good in the South a(τLNP +LSP ): indeed, part of this production
is reexported to Northern poor consumers LNP , and since firms are the ones incurring the
trade-related extra costs, they benefit from a decrease in the latter. On the other hand,
the prices charged for quality to the different Southern consumer groups are not impacted
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by an openness shock (again, firms are the ones bearing all the burden, and consumers
don’t see any impact of variations in τ on the price they pay for a given quality), and labor
demand devoted to the homogeneous good sector is left unchanged. A decrease in τ hence
necessarily leads to a decrease in w: trade integration increases the interregional wage gap.
Considering the expected profits in the case of a successful innovation, piL is positively
impacted by a positive price effect (export costs have decreased regarding the Southern
rich consumers), but suffers from increased production costs (the relative Northern wage
1
w has increased). The “second-round” profits piF are on the other hand impacted by a
positive price effect (export costs have decreased regarding the Northern poor consumers),
and also positively by a decrease in its production costs aw. While the overall impact on
piL (and the resulting variation of φC) is ambiguous, piF necessarily increases, leading to an
increase in both the incumbent’s innovation rate φI and the overall growth rate γ. Trade
liberalization is hence beneficial for the long-run growth rate in our framework
Those different results can be compared to two separate strands of literature: (i) the lit-
erature studying the existing interactions between income distribution and long-run growth
in a closed-economy framework (Foellmi and Zweimuller, 2006; Latzer, 2013); (ii) the lit-
erature investigating the impact of trade liberalization on the long-run growth rate in a
North-South Schumpeterian framework (Dinopoulos and Segerstrom, 2010; Borota, 2012).
First, the literature investigating the impact of income distribution on long-run growth
operating through the product market has done so in the case of expanding-variety (Foellmi
and Zweimuller, 2006; Foellmi et al., 2009) as well as quality-ladder models (Latzer, 2013),
but has systematically tackled the question in a closed economy framework. While the
predictions regarding the impact of a greater wealth concentration differ across modeling
frameworks,12 existing closed-economy models all predicted a positive impact of a greater
wealth gap (i.e. of a lower value of d). In Latzer (2013) in particular, the positive impact
of a lower value of d operates through the stronger price discrimination opportunities for
existing quality leaders innovating for a second time, and the resulting increase in φI .
This positive variation of the incumbent’s R&D investment systematically dominates the
observed decrease in φC in the absence of trade. In our open economy framework, φC
similarly decreases, but this negative variation dominates the sometimes positive impact
on φI : when intra-industrial trade occurs, a wider wealth gap between rich and poor
is systematically detrimental for the long-run growth rate. The further effect operates
through the variations in the Southern relative wage, which is found to be negatively
impacted by negative within-country redistribution shocks.
Second, papers that had so far considered the impact of trade liberalization on the long-
run growth rate and the North-South relative wage had done so in models featuring either
12In the existing expanding-variety models featuring non-homothetic preferences (see, among others,
Foellmi and Zweimuller, 2006), a greater wealth concentration is found to positively impact the long-run
growth rate through a positive price effect and despite a negative market-size effect; on the other hand,
Zweimuller and Brunner (2005) as well as Latzer (2013) predict a negative impact of a higher value of β
an economy’s rate of growth.
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inter-industrial trade (Dinopoulos and Segerstrom, 2010), or supply-driven intra-industrial
trade (Borota, 2012). In those two types of frameworks, lower levels of τ have no impact
on the long-run growth rate: indeed, in models featuring quality-augmented Dixit-Stiglitz
preferences, the constant elasticity of substitution guarantees that gains from exporting
at lower costs are exactly offset by the stronger market penetration of competing firms,
leaving the expected profits in the case of a successful innovation unchanged. In our model
featuring non-homothetic preferences on the other hand, the profits are positively impacted
by a stronger trade liberalization, which results in a positive impact on γ of a decrease in
transport costs τ . To the best of our knowledge, our model is the first to exemplify such
a positive demand-driven impact of trade integration on a country’s long-run growth rate.
Our model furthermore predicts an increase in the relative Northern wage 1w , which is at
odds with the predictions of Borota (2012) in a similar intra-industrial trade framework:
hence, the nature of the trade determinants (either supply- or demand-based) matter when
considering the welfare impact of a greater degree of trade openness.
5 Conclusion
We have hence provided a North-South Schumpeterian model of endogenous growth
being able to account for demand-driven patterns of vertical intra-industrial trade such as
the “Renault-Dacia” case. Disparities in purchasing power within and across regions ensure
the co-existence of mono-quality, mono-location firms and multi-quality, multi-location
firms generating rich patterns of trade and FDI, and also influence the incentives to invest
in R&D of both incumbents and challengers. In the case of a wider intra-country wealth
gap, our model then predicts a negative impact on the long-run growth rate, as well as an
increase in the interregional wage gap. We are also able to demonstrate that liberalization




Bernard, Andrew, Stephen Redding, and Peter Schott, “Multiple-Product Firms
and Product Switching,” American Economic Review, 2010, 100 (1), 70–97.
Borota, Teodora, “Innovation and imitation in a model of North-South trade,” Journal
of International Economics, 2012, 87, 365–376.
Dhingra, Swati, “Trading Away Wide Brands for Cheap Brands,” American Economic
Review, 2013, 103 (6), 2554–84.
Dinopoulos, Elias and Paul Segerstrom, “Intellectual property rights, multinational
firms and economic growth,” Journal of Development Economics, 2010, 92 (1), 13–27.
Eckel, Carsten and Peter Neary, “Multi-Product Firms and Flexible Manufacturing
in the Global Economy,” Review of Economic Studies, 2010, 77, 188–217.
Fajgelbaum, Pablo, Gene M. Grossman, and Elhanan Helpman, “Income Distri-
bution, Product Quality, and International Trade,” Journal of Political Economy, 2011,
119 (4), 721 – 765.
Foellmi, Reto and Josef Zweimuller, “Income Distribution and Demand-Induced In-
novations,” Review of Economic Studies, 2006, 73, 941–960.
, Tobias Wuergler, and Josef Zweimuller, “The Macroeconomics of Model T,”
CEPR Discussion Papers, 2009, (7612).
Follmi, Reto, Christian Hepenstrick, and Josef ZweimÃ¼ller, “Non-homothetic
preferences, parallel imports and the extensive margin of international trade,” Economics
Working Paper Series 1122, University of St. Gallen, School of Economics and Political
Science May 2011.
Grossman, Gene, Elhanan Helpman, and Pablo Fajgelbaum, “A Linder Hypothesis
for FDI,” 2012 Meeting Papers, Society for Economic Dynamics 2012.
Grossman, Gene M. and Elhanan Helpmann, “Quality ladders and product cycles,”
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1991, 106, 557–586.
Latzer, Hélène, “Beyond the Arrow effect: income distribution and multi-quality firms
in a Schumpeterian framework,” Technical Report 2013.
Mussa, Michael and Sherwin Rosen, “Monopoly and Product Quality,” Journal of
Economic Theory, 1978, 18, 301–317.
Neary, Peter, “International Trade in General Oligopolistic Equilibrium,” mimeo, 2009.
Segerstrom, Paul and Elias Dinopoulos, “North-South Trade and Economic Growth,”
CEPR Discussion Paper Series, 2006, (5887).
22
Zweimuller, Josef and Johan Brunner, “Innovation and Growth with Rich and Poor




The Southern labor equilibrium condition yields a linear relationship between overall
wealth Ω and the relative wage w. More precisely, we have w = A0Ω, with:
A0 =
r(−1 + dβ(ξ − σ) + σ + κ(−1 + d(1 + β(ξ − 1)− σ) + σ))
L(κ((2 + κ)(σ − 1) + β(1 + (1 + κ)ξ − (2 + κ)σ)) + a(−1 + σ + β(1− σ + (1 + κ)(κ(1− ξ) + ξτ(1 + κ)))))
We can then express profits piF [Ω] and piL[Ω] as
piF = AFΩ + EF (31)
piL = ALΩ + EL (32)
with
AF =







rκ(1 + κ− d(−1 + β(2 + κ))) +A0L(1− β)((a+ κ(2 + κ))(1− σ) + aστ)
(1 + κ)2
EL =
L(1− β)(κ(2 + κ)σ + a(1 + κ)2(σ(τ − 1)− τ))
(1 + κ)2
We show that under the conditions
0 < AL < AF < r (33)
EF > EL > Fr > 0 (34)
the system formed by equations (24) (25) (26) (27) admits a unique equilibrium. To show
that, it is sufficient to prove that the following two equations cross once on Ω ∈ [0;∞[.
φI = f(Ω) =
piF (piL − Fr)
F (piF − piL) (35)
φI = g(Ω) =
(piF − Fr)(piL + Fr − rΩ)
F (piF − piL − 2Fr + rΩ) (36)
First, f(Ω) is continuous in Ω+ since its only discontinuity is in EF−ELAL−AF which is nega-
tive under conditions (33) and (34) . We also have
(i)limΩ→0 f(Ω) =
EF (EL−Fr)
F (EF−EL) which is positive under condition (34);
(ii) limΩ→∞ f(Ω) =∞ under condition (33) ;
(iii) The derivative of f(Ω) w.r.t Ω has two potential roots in Ω ∈<. These are
∗︷ ︸︸ ︷
AFAL(EL − EF ) +/−√∆
AFAL(AF−AL)
where ∆ = AFAL(ALEF − AFEL)(ALEF − AFEL + (AF − AL)Fr). Since ∗ is negative
under condition (34) and the denominator positive under (33), at least one of these poten-
tial roots, if any, is negative. Hence there is at maximum one extremum in <+, if any.
Combining (iii) with (i) and (ii) ensures that f(Ω) is positive and increasing in <+.
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Second, g(Ω) is continuous except in Ω = ΩA = −EF+EL+2FrAF−AL+r where it admits a vertical
asymptot. We also have
(i) The function g(Ω) has at maximum one potential extremum candidate because the
potential roots of its derivatives are AF (AL−r)(2Fr−EF+EL)+/−
√
∆
AF (AL−r)(AF−AL+r) with ∆ = AF (AL −
r)[ALEF −AFEL − (EF + (AF +AL)F )r + Fr2]2 < 0 under condition (33);
(ii) limΩ→−∞ = ∞ ; limΩ→Ω−A g(Ω) = −∞ ; limΩ→Ω+A g(Ω) = +∞ ; limΩ→∞ g(Ω) = −∞
under conditions (33) and (34).
Combining (i) and (ii) , g(Ω) is monotonously decreasing on Ω ∈]−∞; ΩA[∪]ΩA;∞[.
(iii) g(Ω) admits two roots in Fr−EFAF and
EF+Fr
r−AL . Note that under condition (34) and
(33) the first root is negative and the second is positive. Given limΩ→Ω−A g(Ω) = −∞ and
monotony we hence have that for ΩA > 0 g(Ω) is negative on Ω ∈ [0; Ω2[.
Combining (iii) with (i) and (ii) we have that g(Ω) < 0 for 0 < Ω < ΩA. For Ω > ΩA,
g(Ω) > 0, it is infinite for values of Ω very close to ΩA and decreases toward minus infinity
as Ω increases.
As a result, for ΩA > 0, since limΩ→Ω+2 g(Ω)− f(Ω) = +∞ under conditions (33), the
functions f(Ω) and g(Ω) cross once on Ω ∈ [0;∞[ under conditions (33) and (34). For
ΩA < 0 we also need that the function crosses in <+, that is limΩ→0 g(Ω)−f(Ω) > 0 which
is always satisfied for ΩA < 0. Finally, the set of conditions is non empty as provided by
numerical simulations. An illustration is provided in Figure . Intuitions on the value of
parameters for which we have existence and uniqueness is given in part 2. This ends the
proof. 
A2
We discuss conditions on the parameters in order to satisfy the general conditions for
the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium.
(i) For 0 < AL < AF < r. First, note that since w = A0Ω we must have A0 > 0. The
numerator of (31) is always negative. The denominator must hence be negative which arises
for a τ and a sufficiently low. Second, AL > 0. We can write piL as piL = apiLΩ+bpiLw+cpiL
where AL = apiL + bpiLA0. It is straightforward to show that apiL , bpiL > 0. With A0 > 0
this ensures AL > 0. Third, for non-extreme values of the parameters we have (a) with a
and τ low we have AF > 0; (b) β affects AF and AL through A0 and directly. The effect
of β through A0 is positive but dominated by the direct effect, especially when d, a and
τ are low enough. The direct effect of β on AF is positive while it is negative on AL. As
a result, for non extreme values of the vector of parameters we have AF > AL for β high
enough (reinforced by d, a and τ sufficiently low). Forth, we have r > AF for τ and a low.
Hence, we have (33) satisfied for a and τ sufficiently low and β sufficiently high.
(ii) For EF > EL > Fr > 0. First, EF > 0 and Fr > 0. Second, EL > 0 for a and τ
sufficiently low. Indeed the denominator of EL is positive and its numerator is positive for
a and τ sufficiently low. Third, we have that β has a positive effect on EF and a negative
one on EL. Also, since EL > 0, we have EF > EL for β sufficiently high. Fourth, we have
EL > Fr for L large enough.
As a result the conditions (33) and (34) are satified for (i)τ and a sufficiently low, i.e. the
cost of the firms are not too high wich ensures their presence; (ii) L sufficiently high i.e.
the market is sufficiently large; (iii)d sufficiently low and β sufficiently high i.e, the rich are
rich enough to ensure the presence of the leader and the group of poors is large enough to
ensure the presence of the follower. These conditions hence yield the coexistence of R&D
undertaken by firms to become a Successful challenger or a Successful Incumbent.
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Figure 2: Steady state equilibrium
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